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CARAMADRE’S LOOPHOLE: EXPLOITING THE FINE PRINT, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS &
TERMINALLY-ILL

Joseph Caramdre is an estate planner and lawyer with a penchant for taking advantage of
a good deal. He came up with what he called “creations” 1 that allowed him to exploit
loopholes. 2 He claims that he has a compulsion toward finding mistakes in offers, then
exploiting the better end of the bargain. 3 But Caramadre is much more than an extreme
couponer. 4 He dabbled in something much more dubious that has landed him at the center of a
number of civil suits and a federal criminal indictment.
Caramadre bet on terminally ill persons to die, then profited off of their death. 5 In the
mid-1990s, Caramadre attended an insurance seminar 6 about variable annuities. 7 This is where
he got the idea for this, his most infamous, “creation.” In its simplest terms, this type of variable
annuity was very much like a life insurance policy. One party took out a plan that paid out to a
beneficiary if and when the insured died. The major distinction between life insurance and a
variable annuity, something that allowed this “creation” to function, is that annuities were not
considered “insurance” under Rhode Island law. 8 This allowed Caramadre to take out variable

1

Caramadre has made 19 such “creations” in his lifetime...Number three was a short-lived, sure-fire way to win at
the racetrack. Jake Bernstein, Joseph Caramadre is a Robin Hood or Con Artist Depending on Who You Ask,
HUFFINGTON POST, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/25/joseph-carmadre-robinhood_n_1829990.html. Creation number four was awarded Caramadre $1200 of office furniture at a significant
discount. Id.o (Find out about the other creations if possible and put them in this footnote).
2
This American Life: Loopholes, Chicago Public Radio (August 23, 2012) (Dowloaded using iTunes) (Transcript
available at, http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/473/transcript); Bernstein, supra, note 1; See,
infra, PART II for further discussion of Caramadre and his creations. One of which allowed him to purchase $1200
of office furniture at an extremely discounted rate. Caramadre had to buy calendars that contained the coupons. But
he bought so many calendars that the seller cut him a deal for buying in bulk.
3
This American Life, supra, note 2.
4
There is a television show called “Extreme Couponers” about people who find and use as many coupons as
possible to get as much savings as possible. See EXTREME COUPONING, http://tlc.howstuffworks.com/tv/extremecouponing (last visited Dec. 5, 2012).
5
This American Life, supra, note 2; Bernstein, supra, note 1.
6
Caramadre is also a licensed insurance broker. This American Life, supra, note 2.
7
See infra Part II for an explanation about how this type of variable annuity works.
8
W. Reserve Life Assur. Co. of Ohio v. Conreal LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 270, 276 (D.R.I. 2010)
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annuity plans on terminally ill people because, even though the law does not allow someone to
take out a life insurance plan on a third party, he could put up the money for a variable annuity
with the third party as the measuring life. This subtle distinction in the law, this loophole,
allowed Caramadre and a number of investors to make millions of dollars off of the death of the
terminally ill. 9 But, he did this with their consent and even compensated them for each plan that
they were used as a measuring life. 10
This article discusses the ethical implications of such a “creation” and concludes that
Caramadre’s scheme, 11 even though it may have been well-intentioned, financially coerced the
annuitants to enter into the scheme, 12 was wrong in and of itself, 13 violated economic moral
theory, 14 and created a market for death and dying that runs counter to long standing ethical
principles. 15 While certain ethical theories are discussed, this piece is largely undergirded in the
philosophy of narrative ethics. Generally, this seeks to answer fundamental questions about the
commodification of life and death, exploitation of the terminally-ill and dying, and the interplay
between bioethics and economic morality. Part I seeks to explain Joseph Caramadre, his career,
and how he has been viewed by the media since his indictment. Part II focuses on the structure
of this “creation” and how it came to be that one could legally profit off of another’s death,
knowing that he could die at any minute. Part III focuses on the terminally ill people that he
selected for this scheme. It explains how they benefited and/or how they felt slighted by the
transaction. Part IV discusses the legal implications for Caramadre and his associate. His
9

Indictment United States v. Caramadre, available at http://www.propublica.org/documents/item/413342indictment-against-joseph-caramadre.
10
He gave each person a sum of $2,000 per signature on each annuity. See infra Part III.
11
It should be noted that this type of transaction would not be possible without the implicit consent of the financial
institutions that sold these annuities. See infra PARTS IV & V for further discussion.
12
See infra PART III for a discussion about the annuitants and financial coercion
13
See infra PART IV for a discussion of Caramadre’s scheme as mala in se.
14
See infra PART V. B. for a discussion of economic theories surrounding moral transactions.
15
See infra PART V. A. for a discussion of the various ethical schools of thought that would oppose the
commoditization of death. This section primarily draws from legal realism, natural law, and utilitarianism.
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criminal charges will be of particular import here since much of the criminal allegations are
grounded in a deep history of ethics. It is my contention that Caramadre’s scheme should be
classified as a crime that is mala in se, or wrong in and of itself. Part V discusses the larger
ethical implications behind such a deal. A discussion of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ the Path
of the Law will be used to inform the discussion. 16 Of primary focus will be the practical
ramifications of commoditizing life and death in such a way and the harmful effects of an
unregulated securities market that deals in such speculation.
PART I—JOSEPH CARAMADRE
Joseph Caramadre is a polarizing figure. 17 Caramandre was born and raised in Rhode
Island. 18 He became a certified financial planner, life insurance agent, estate planner, and
lawyer. 19 He put himself through Suffolk Law School at night. 20 He is a devout catholic,
philanthropist, and has received high commendations from local charities. 21 He has also been
called a con artist, a thief, and much, much worse. 22 What is true, despite the accolades or
derisions, is that Caramadre is obsessed with getting a good deal. 23
Caramadre has delved into contracts, investments, and even coupons just to get more than
the other party intended him to get. 24 He unabashedly searched for loopholes in every offer, an
unintended benefit that he could exploit. Throughout his life, Caramadre prided himself in

16

Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARVARD L. REV. 457 (1897)..
See Bernstein, supra, note 1.
18
This American Life, supra, note 2
19
Id.; Bernstein, supra, note 1.
20
This American Life, supra, note2
21
Caramadre won the Tocqueville Society Philanthropy Award through his local chapter of the United Way for his
work with over 40 different charities. Id.
22
Bernstein, supra, note 1.
23
By his own account, Caramadre is “hardwired” to spot mistakes in offers and exploit them, This American Life,
supra, note 2.
24
Id.; Bernstein, supra, note 1.
17
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outwitting people and getting more than they intended him to receive. 25 He devised several
schemes throughout his lifetime to accomplish this goal of exploiting loopholes. He calls each of
these loopholes his “creations.” 26
His schemes were typically innocuous. For example, Caramadre once bought a calendar
from a local office super store that came with coupons. He noticed that one such coupon was
missing a key clause. Instead of saying “$25 off any piece of furniture over $200,” it merely
stated, “$25 off any piece of furniture.” 27 Caramadre was naturally drawn to this mistake. “I
noticed that mistake there. It was normal for me to notice it. I’m kind of hard-wired for this
stuff.” 28
He could not help himself from exploiting this mistake. Caramadre bought as many of
these calendars as he could, so many that the company selling the calendars gave him a discount
on the calendars. Finally, once the coupons came due, he bought every piece of furniture under
$25 that he could find. 29 He got to the register with $1,200 in furniture, handed the cashier a
stack of coupons, and walked out the door with more furniture than he literally knew what to do
with. 30 He had so much that he gave some away to charity. 31
Caramadre wasted time on procuring things that he was going to give away. As Ira Glass
of This American Life commented,
Who does this? Think of the effort involved. He had to read through twelve
months of fine print, buy all of these calendars, remember the scheme, and come
back several months later to claim his prize. And for what? $1,200 of cheap
office furniture that he didn’t even need. He actually had to borrow a truck from a

25

This American Life, supra, note 2; Bernstein, supra, note 1.
This American Life, supra, note 2.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
26
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friend to take it all home where, he says, he stored it in a garage, and gave some
to friends, family and charity. 32
This office furniture scheme was “Creation 4.” 33 “Creation 3” was a surefire way to win at the
racetrack. 34 “Creation 18” is what landed Caramadre and his associate in serious legal trouble.
Caramadre was inspired to create “Creation 18” during the normal course of his business
life. As an estate planner and life insurance agent, Caramadre attended many seminars that
about various estate planning devices. 35 The particular seminar that inspired “Creation 18” was
about variable annuities with a death benefit guarantee. 36 What drew Caramadre to variable
annuities was the extremely low risk involved in the investment. 37 In short, this particular type
of variable annuity functioned a bit like a life insurance policy in that a financial payout was
triggered at the death of the insured. 38 The death benefit guarantee meant that investors would
not lose any of the money that they invested in the annuity. 39 After listening to the seminar,
Caramadre poured through hundreds of pages of prospectuses and fine print, searching for a way
to exploit variable annuities.
Caramadre found the loophole and exploited it. 40 Allegedly, he and other investors
associated with him made millions of dollars from investing in variable annuities. 41 They
accomplished this feat by using terminally ill and dying people as the “measuring lives” over the

32

Id.
Id.
34
Bernstein, supra, note 1.
35
This American Life, supra, note 2.
36
Id.; see infra PART II for a discussion about variable annuities and the details of Creation 18.
37
This American Life, supra, note 2
38
Id.; see infra PART II for a more detailed analysis.
39
This American Life, supra, note 2
40
See infra PART II.
41
Indictment, supra, note 9.
33
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course of a decade. 42 This required Caramadre to ask dying people if he could profit off of their
death. 43 This was something that Caramadre felt comfortable with, however. He noted,
“I think a lot of my success in the life insurance industry has been because I
always treat death as a part of life and it’s very easy for me to talk about it. I’m
around death all of the time. Estate planning is all about death planning. So... I
guess I might have been the first one to ever ask anyone, can we use their name
and their health status for the benefit of others? Yes, I was a little nervous, but, on
the other hand, if the person didn’t want to do it, they didn’t have to do it.” 44
Caramadre’s unique perspective on life and death allowed “Creation 18” to flourish, but
it ultimately led to Caramadre’s demise.
Caramadre is currently embroiled in very significant legal battles. 45 He still faces
civil liability even though his criminal trial has ended. 46 Caramadre and his associate,
Raymour Radhakrishnan, stood trial in Rhode Island based on a 66 count grand jury
indictment. 47 The trial began in the second week of November and was expected to last
three to four months with hundreds of witnesses.

However, after only a few days,

Caramadre and Radhakrishnan pled guilty to two of the 66 counts: identity fraud and
conspiracy to commit the same. 48 Each man faces ten years in jail. 49
PART II—VARIABLE ANNUITIES
The scheme presented Caramadre with these significant legal problems is simple. In a
way, variable annuities are like life insurance policies. When a person purchases a life insurance

42

Id. This American Life, supra, note 2; Bernstein, supra, note 1
This American Life, supra, note 2.
44
Id.
45
See, infra, PART III for a discussion of Caramadre’s potential civil and criminal liability.
46
W. Reserve Life Assur. Co. of Ohio v. Conreal LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 270, 276 (D.R.I. 2010)
47
Indictment, supra, note 9.
48
Erika Niedowski, Philanthropist Pleads Guilty to Cheating the Terminally Ill, ASSOCIATED PRESS, available at
http://www2.turnto10.com/news/2012/nov/19/10/philanthropist-pleads-guilty-scheme-involving-term-ar-1246024/.
49
Id.
43
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policy, he makes periodic payments to the insurance company and, if he dies, 50 his beneficiary
gets a lump sum. 51 A variable annuity is more like an investment than a safety net. 52 With a
variable annuity, an individual contracts with an insurance company to make a lump-sum
payment or a series of payments. 53 The insurance company agrees to make periodic payments at
some future date. 54 Typically, the individual can choose to invest his money in a certain mutual
fund or funds.

55

The incentive to invest in a variable annuity is the “Death Benefit Guarantee.” This
guarantees that the money that the investor initially invested will be available upon the triggering
event, i.e. the death of the annuitant. 56 For example, if a person invested $10,000 in a variable
annuity, he would still get the original $10,000 back at the death of the annuitant even if the
mutual fund in which he invested plummeted. 57 It is a safe bet: no risk 58 and possibly very high
reward. 59 The catch is that, as the annuities were intended to function, the investor has to die in
order to get any reward. 60

50

A term life insurance policy only covers the insured for a period of time. If he or she lives past the term, then the
insurance expires. Whole life insurance has an investment component as well. Even if the insured lives past a
specific term, he or she still has some money invested. Whole Life Insurance or Term? SMART MONEY (April 5,
2012 4:29 PM), http://www.smartmoney.com/plan/insurance/term-or-whole-life-8011/.
51
Jake Bernstein, Death Takes a Policy: How a Lawyer Exploited the Fine Print and Found Himself Facing
Federal Charges, PROPUBLICA, (Aug. 24, 2012 10:02 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/death-takes-a-policyhow-a-lawyer-exploited-the-fine-print.
51
Id.
52
Variable Annuities, SEC, (May 3, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/answers/varann.htm; This American Life, supra,
note 2; Bernstein, supra, note 1.
53
Variable Annuities, supra, note 52.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
An annuitant is the person upon whom a life-insurance contract is based. Annuitant, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/annuitant.asp#axzz2Em7i2jbS (last visited Dec. 11, 2012).
57
This American Life, supra, note 1.
58
Technically, very low risk. The only risk is that the investment won’t keep up with the rate of inflation.
59
Having the money guaranteed encourages riskier, more profitable investment. Mark Gibbs, Making a Business
Out of Death, FORBES, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/markgibbs/2012/08/25/making-a-business-out-ofdeath/.
60
Id.
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However, Caramadre poured through the investment prospectus and the fine print and
found that there was a loophole. In a variable annuity there are three parties to the transaction:
the investor, the beneficiary, and the annuitant. 61 Typically, the investor and the annuitant are
the same person. That is, “I, Joe Smith, take out this annuity with myself as the annuitant. In the
event of my death, my wife can still live comfortably off the proceeds of this annuity.” What
Caramadre figured out with variable annuities was that the annuitant and the investor did not
have to be the same person. 62 They did not even have to be related. 63
So instead of the traditional model above, Caramadre’s variable annuity scheme looked
fundamentally different. There were three distinct parties in each transaction. 64 The investor put
the money up for the annuity; the annuitant allowed the investor to use his life as a measuring
life, at the annuitant’s death the beneficiary would be paid out; and the beneficiary who received
the annuity payments. There are laws in virtually every state that prohibit an individual from
taking out a life insurance policy on another person. 65 The reason for these laws is simple: the
state does not want people to murder people upon whom they took out policies, and insurance
companies do not want people doing what Caramadre did. 66 However, in Rhode Island, where
Caramadre practiced, there was a federal district court decision that held that annuities are
different from life insurance. 67 Therefore, annuities were not subject to the same laws as life
insurance policies.
Caramadre’s scheme was legal by the letter of the law. Since the Rhode Island law
against taking out insurance policies on unrelated third parties did not apply to variable annuities,
61

Id.
This American Life, supra, note 2.
63
Id.
64
Bernstein, supra, note 51.
65
See, e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws §27-4-27(a)(West 2010).
66
This American Life, supra, note 2.
67
Bernstein, supra, note 51; Gibbs, supra, note 59.
62

8

Caramadre could legally purchase them with unrelated third parties as the measuring life. 68 With
variable annuities he could invest money in a mutual fund with full knowledge that the annuitant
would die within a short period of time. Most importantly, at least for Caramadre and his
investors, his bet was guaranteed. “It’s like going to the horses. When you leave the horse track,
if you won, you keep the winnings. If you lose, they give you your money back.” 69
The only catch for Caramadre, at this point, was that he needed people to agree to be the
annuitant, and he needed them to die soon. 70 To test this scheme, he asked a dying member of his
church if he could use her as the annuitant. He offered her compensation for her signature. 71 The
annuity form asked for the relationship between the investor and the annuitant. Caramadre
responded, “N-O-N-E. None. No relationship.” 72 This was the only probing question that the
annuity form asked. 73 Unlike most life insurance policies, which request extensive information
about the measuring life’s health status, the financial institutions selling the variable annuities
did not ask a single question about the annuitant’s health. 74 Thus, Caramadre had the test case
for “Creation 18.”
Within a few months, the first annuitant died. 75 The account lost money. 76 His initial
investment was down $1,000. 77 Caramadre paid his respects to his fellow church member’s

68

Reserve Life Assur. Co. of Ohio v. Conreal LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 270, 276 (D.R.I. 2010) on reconsideration in
part sub nom. W. Reserve Life Assur. Co. of Ohio v. Caramadre, 847 F. Supp. 2d 329 (D.R.I. 2012).
69
This American Life, supra, note 1; Bernstein, supra, note 51
70
The annuitant needed to provide the name, date of birth, and social security number on the annuity form. In order
for this investment to be at all profitable within Caramadre’s lifetime, the annuitant needed to die before Caramadre
did. Bernstein, supra, note 51; This American Life, supra, note 2.
71
$500 for this attempt. The sum later increased to $2,000. This American Life, supra, note 2.
72
This quote is Caramadre’s spoken word, not what was actually written on the document. This American Life,
supra, note 2.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
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family then processed the annuity that he had taken out. 78 The insurance company paid out
Caramadre’s request, the entirety of his initial investment plus interest. 79 The test case worked
exactly as Caramadre had planned, and “Creation 18” was off and running. 80
Shortly after the first attempt, Caramadre and some investors submitted four different
variable annuities to the same company, all using the same annuitant—another dying person—
and no relationship to him. 81 Caramadre submitted one piece of paper to the company stating,
essentially, “this person died; pay these four owners.” 82 When this annuitant died, Caramadre
and his investors were paid with no questions asked. To be clear, Caramadre and three other
people each took out a variable annuity with the same company on a dying person to whom they
had no relationship. Then, when the person died within a very short period of time, the company
paid them all out without a single question asked. This cycle repeated for several years. 83
Carl Ferrera, a dentist from Massachusetts, put the pension plan for his dentistry business
into this variable annuity. 84 “For me, it was an ideal position to put some of my pension money
in, where there would be growth and guaranteed principal protection, and I would protect both
myself and my employees from the fluctuations from the market,” he said. 85 It made perfect
sense from an investment standpoint, even for the companies who sold these annuities. Usually,
an investor put his money in the annuity and then the company could collect upwards of four

78

Id.
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
According to the indictment, the scheme began in 1995 and did not end until 2010. Indictment at 9 United States
v. Caramadre, available at http://www.propublica.org/documents/item/413342-indictment-against-joseph-caramadre.
84
This American Life, supra, note 2.
85
Id. Ferrera saw a retributive bonus in this creation. “Isn’t this something? How many times had we dealt with
insurance companies and been denied claims, whether it’s on your homeowners’, or your medical insurance, or your
dental insurance and they refer you to some policy in fine print, and you say to yourself, ‘you need a lawyer to read
this’? Isn’t this great!? Finally, there is a lawyer who read this and is going to hoist them on their own petard.”
79

10

percent in fees from that money for years. 86 When people purchased these plans for the purpose
that the company intended, variable annuities were money-making plans for the company. 87 But,
of course, Caramadre was not purchasing these plans for the purpose that the insurance company
intended. He used terminally ill and dying people as the annuitants.
PART III—THE ANNUITANTS
Caramadre needed a special type of annuitant—one that would die in a relatively short
period of time—in order for his scheme to work. 88 He took out ads in local catholic newspapers
soliciting terminally-ill people to become annuitants. 89 He offered them a financial incentive for
participating. 90 This unique relationship, however, created several problems when attempting to
parse out the ethical dilemmas involved. Each annuitant suffered his own condition, which may
have impaired his ability to consent to the deal. Additionally, the financial incentive that
Caramadre offered coupled with medical bills and a desire to care for his loved ones after the
annuitant passed made them susceptible to being financially coerced into acting in a way that
they might otherwise find morally reprehensible.
A. How the Annuitants Felt About the Deal

86

Id.; Gibbs, supra, note 59.
Assume that a 45 year old, healthy investor puts $100,000 in a variable annuity. Assume he lives until he is 70.
Assume the company collects 5% in fees each year. Under these facts, the company has made $125,000 off of the
investor’s initial $100,000 investment at the time of his death. Gibbs, supra, note 59. “As competition intensified in
the mid-2000s, many life insurance companies launched an unprecedented war for customers, offering benefits they
now acknowledge were far, far too favorable. The insurance companies’ contracts provided little defense against
Caramadre’s approach. For policies under a million dollars, they didn’t check the health status of people receiving
variable annuities. Instead, they limited the ages of annuitants or the amount that could be invested. All that the
companies required for persons to serve as a measuring life was their signature, birthdate and Social Security
number. Some didn’t even require the signature.” Id.
88
See infra PART II.
89
The ad simply read, “Terminal Illnes? $2,000 CASH.” Bernstein, supra, note 1. Mike Pottenger, Death and the
Market: The Peculiar Dealings of Joseph Caramadre, THE CONVERSATION (Nov. 2, 2012, 2:40 PM AEST),
http://theconversation.edu.au/death-and-the-market-the-peculiar-dealings-of-joseph-caramadre-10063.
90
This American Life, supra, note 2; Bernstein, supra, note 51.
87
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The annuitants, for the most part, were more than happy to sign up for Caramadre’s
scheme. 91 He offered them $2,000 just for agreeing to a visit, then an additional sum of money
for each annuity form that the annuitant signed. 92 He offered them money and a comfortable
end-of-life that they might not have enjoyed otherwise. 93
What I told Raymour was... I can’t thank him enough... I could not thank him
enough, him and his boss, for supplying my wife with the best days of her life for
the couple of months before she passed away. And to this day I’ll be forever
grateful no matter what ... I could care less how much they got. I know that my
wife had the best days of her life because of what they did for her, and I’ll never
be thankful enough. 94
The annuitants stood to make a substantial sum of money off of, essentially, selling their
signature and personal information. 95 Thus, even though Caramadre and the beneficiaries were
making even more money from signing up each annuitant, the annuitants were also making
money. 96 Not only did it provide the annuitants with a more comfortable end of life but, to some,
it allowed them to do things for their family members that they would not have otherwise been
able to do. A daughter of one of the annuitants explained how her mother was able to pay bills
that she otherwise would not have been able to pay and buy gifts for her loved ones.
[A]t the time, she had been sickly, and financially, as most people in her age
group, things like prescriptions were becoming a stretch to afford. She couldn't
buy Christmas presents for her grandchildren and her great grandchildren. And
there were certain things that she needed, whether it be hair color or to go to
91

This American Life, supra, note 2.
Id.
93
Deposition of Charles Buckman, Excerpts of Video Depositions in the Case Against Joseph Caramadre,
PROPUBLICA, (Aug. 24, 2012 10:01 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/excerpts-of-video-depositions-in-thecase-against-joseph-caramadre.
94
Id.
95
Each annuitant was paid $2,000 for an initial consultation and an additional sum for each annuity taken out on
them. The exact amount paid per transaction is not clear, but was typically between $3,000 and $10,000. Charles
Buckman and his wife were parties to at least 9 such transactions. This American Life, supra, note 2.
96
Whether or not the amount of money being made was proportional to the other is unknown. Caramadre would
make money off the transactions in a couple of different ways. Some institutions gave him a flat rate for signing
people up while other times he would agree to share a percentage of the profit with the investor/beneficiary. This
American Life, supra, note 2. The fact that each party benefited financially in the transaction could be classified as
a “Pareto improvement” under economic theory. This theory holds that a given transaction is acceptable if both of
the parties are at least as well-off as they were prior to the transaction. Pottenger, supra, note 89.
92
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Wright's Chicken Farm with the elderly and whatnot. She didn't have her own
money for that, so she relied on us for that, and that bothered her... But working
with Joe, the compensation he gave her gave her back her dignity. She would go
to the mall with my granddaughter and I, and when I said no to a Webkinz, my
mom could say, I can do this. And that made her—that's what gave my mom
happiness, really. 97

However, not all of the annuitants were as pleased with the way Caramadre handled everything.
The daughter of one annuitant called the scheme “slimy,” 98 while one annuitant claimed
to be deceived by Caramadre and Radhakrishnan. Among other things, one annuitant, Robert
Mizzoni, claimed that he never signed any annuity forms and that Caramadre and Radhakrishnan
never informed him of what was going on. 99 After talking to investigators, Mizzoni was upset to
find out what was going on.
Make me upset? Because my body is going to be sold without my wife getting a
dime. How do you feel? How do you feel? How do you feel if I was to bury you,
and you got insurance, and your wife don't get nothing. No way is it going to
happen to me. I got news for you. They better drop this policy in a hurry. If they
don't, I'll sue. How about that one? 100

The available deposition testimony makes a few things clear. First, the annuitant and their
family members had strong feelings one way or the other about “Creation 18.” Second, some
annuitants appear to lack an understanding about the nature of the transaction. This lack of
understanding may be attributable to one of two possibilities; (1) either Caramadre and his
97

This American Life, supra, note 2.
Pottenger, supra, note 89.
99
This American Life, supra, note 2; Deposition of Robert Mizzoni, Excerpts of Video Depositions in the Case
Against Joseph Caramadre, PROPUBLICA, (Aug. 24, 2012 10:01 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/excerptsof-video-depositions-in-the-case-against-joseph-caramadre.
100
This American Life, supra, note 2. Mr. Mizzoni, who was 86 at the time of the deposition, has since passed but it
appears as though no formal complaint has been filed on his behalf against Caramadre. Interestingly, Caramadre
had known Mizzoni for several years. Mizzoni was a school bus driver that drove Caramadre to school. They
attended the same church and Caramadre had done favors for the Mizzonis. Caramadre’s wife was the beneficiary
on the Mizzoni annuity. Caramadre claims that the source of Mizzoni’s rage toward him stemmed from misleading
facts provided by the investigator. “He's being informed, or told, or given the understanding that my wife gets $1
million when he dies, and we only invested $10,000. So he doesn't know the real facts. I believe if he thought my
wife was getting $10,000 back, and I put up the $10,000, and he already got his $2,000, he may not be upset at that
at all. Of course, he would need to have been told the truth.” Id.; Deposition of Robert Mizzoni, supra, note 99.
98
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associate did not properly explain the nature of the transaction, including the possibility that the
annuitants were outright defrauded; or (2) the annuitants were physically or mentally incapable
of grasping the nature of the transaction.
B. The Annuitants’ Ability to Consent and Financial Coercion
Several legal doctrines present themselves because of the health status of the annuitants;
each doctrine generally prohibits individuals from taking advantage of the less fortunate. 101 The
unorthodox nature of these deals between Caramadre and the annuitants presents several
problems. The first issue is whether or not the annuitants had the capacity to enter into the
contract with Caramadre. 102 The unique structure of the “creation” begs the question of what
form of capacity is necessary to enter into this deal. 103 From the annuitant’s perspective, the
transaction is twofold. 104 A court, if presented with the issue, 105 might examine whether the
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Each annuitant undoubtedly had his or her own health issues, each of which could possibly raise several issues of
fact. The government is seeking to exploit the unique nature of these relationships in order to bring forth criminal
charges. For example, there are several counts in the indictment that hinge on material misrepresentations and
failures to disclose the nature of the investment to the annuitants. Indictment, supra, note 9. While a criminal
conviction will largely depend on what Caramadre or Radhakrishnan did or did not do, when one looks at the nature
of these relationships in a vacuum, several questions are raised regarding the physical and mental state of the
annuitants. Several legal doctrines crop up immediately including whether the annuitant lacked capacity, was under
duress or undue influence, and whether Caramadre had obtained something akin to the annuitant’s informed consent
to enter into this agreement. Even if none of these doctrines are dispositive and the contract may be upheld under
an analysis of each doctrine, a court may still find the contracts to be void as against public policy or that they are
unconscionable. Each of these doctrines, at their respective core, are grounded in the premise that the court should
not allow one party to unethically take advantage of the other by means of the law. When a court decides one of
these issues, it is making normative value judgments based on the subjective states of another. In other words, it is
deciding whether or not one of the parties, or both, has acted unethically. See Holmes, supra, note 18.
102
Capacity is a critical issue for all contracts. A contract is either void or voidable if one of the parties lacks
testamentary capacity. 265-AUG N.J. Law. 14.
103
Arguably, this type of transaction requires two different types of capacity. The annuitants should have the
capacity to enter into the contract with Caramadre and testamentary capacity to dispose of their estate.
104
The annuitant is both entering into an agreement with Caramadre and engaging in a highly unorthodox form of
estate planning. The annuitant is receiving money from Caramadre in exchange for her signature, but also she is
assigning the annuity to a third party upon her death.
105
Perhaps tellingly, it appears as though none of the annuitants have sued Caramadre or Radhakrishnan. This
would likely be the only way that this precise issue would be presented before a court since, in the criminal case, the
issue is whether Caramadre committed fraud upon the annuitants. In civil cases between Caramadre and the
financial institutions, this issue appears to have not been raised. W. Reserve Life Assur. Co. of Ohio v. Conreal
LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 270, 276 (D.R.I. 2010) on reconsideration in part sub nom. W. Reserve Life Assur. Co. of
Ohio v. Caramadre, 847 F. Supp. 2d 329 (D.R.I. 2012).
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annuitant had both the capacity to make the contract with Caramadre 106 and testamentary
capacity. 107 Duress and undue influence would likewise have to be analyzed in a similar
manner, but would present more issues of fact since such an analysis would take into account not
only the annuitant’s state of mind but Caramadre’s actions as well. 108
Assuming that a court could find that the agreement between Caramadre and each of the
annuitants met all of the standards above a court still may find that the contract is void as against
public policy. 109 If this were the case, then the court might be making a value judgment that the
conduct involved runs counter to the morals of the jurisdiction as prescribed by the legislature. 110
Even if Caramadre and Radhakrishnan orchestrated the scheme in a way that would have
satisfied a court examining such issues, the ethical issues extend beyond these pseudo-moral
legal doctrines.
Primary among these ethical issues is whether or not the annuitants consented to this
scheme or whether they were exploited by Caramadre. Over the course of several years,
106

Capacity under the law of contracts is fairly straight forward. “To make a valid contract, each party must be of
sufficient mental capacity to appreciate the effect of what he or she is doing, and must also be able to exercise his or
her will with reference thereto. There must be a meeting of the minds to effect [sic] assent, and there can be no
meeting of the minds where either party to the agreement is mentally incapable of understanding the consequences
of his or her acts.” 265-AUG N.J. Law. 14.
107
Testamentary capacity, in most jurisdictions, is an even lower standard than in the law of contracts. A testator
must simply be capable of knowing, not actually know, what she has, who she is giving it to, and the type of
disposition that she is making. Id.
108
Undue influence in contract depends on the facts of the case. Generally, age, mental and physical capacity, and
whether or not the party had independent advice regarding the transaction are all relevant in determining whether or
not undue influence took place. 25 Am. Jur. 2d Duress and Undue Influence § 37. Duress involves compulsion or
coercion by the dominant party that overrides the free will of the weaker party. 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 232. In
regard to the law of estates, undue influence generally has four elements: “(1) a person who is subject to undue
influence; a disposition to exert undue influence; (3) an opportunity to exert undue influence; and (4) a result
indicating undue influence.” 36 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 109 (Originally published in 1983). Undue influence is
considered a species of duress. 25 Am. Jur. 2d Duress and Undue Influence § 36. Much like the law of contracts,
whether or not undue influence occurred depends on the facts of the case. 36 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 109
(Originally published in 1983).
109
5 Williston on Contracts § 12:1 (4th ed.)
110
This is again where Caramadre’s creation is ingenious. It would be hard to find this to be violative of public
policy under Rhode Island since annuities are treated differently than life insurance and immune from the law
prohibiting such transactions. W. Reserve Life Assur. Co. of Ohio v. Conreal LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 270, 276
(D.R.I. 2010) on reconsideration in part sub nom. W. Reserve Life Assur. Co. of Ohio v. Caramadre, 847 F. Supp.
2d 329 (D.R.I. 2012)
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Caramadre and Radhakrishnan signed up over 150 annuitants. 111 Each annuitant presents a
unique set of facts to consider when discussing the issue of consent. For instance, one annuitant
was so debilitated by her illness that she was unable to physically sign the annuity forms. 112 On
the other hand, some claim to have been made completely aware of the transaction and had no
qualms with others profiting off of their death. 113 As it is impossible to know exactly what each
annuitant knew and what they were capable of thinking or doing at the time of the transaction, it
is better to note here a few major issues that undergird the sense of squeamishness that most
people feel when listening to Caramadre’s scheme as it relates to the annuitants’ ability to
consent.
First, each annuitant’s health status makes consent to this agreement automatically
suspect. Every annuitant was dying or close to death at the time that Caramadre entered them
into the scheme. This, by itself, should not affect a person’s ability to consent since the health
industry relies on terminally ill people to make their own end-of-life decisions if they are
capable. 114 Therefore, it seems that the annuitant’s health status alone is insufficient to render
this transaction morally reprehensible.
However, offering to pay each annuitant for their personal information presents an issue
of coercion. Caramadre’s offer to pay each annuitant, who doubtlessly could use the money
either to pay for bills or care for loved ones after their death, begins to encroach on the
terminally ill person’s autonomy in making their own end of life estate plan. Offering a financial
incentive to scam these insurance companies financially coerces a terminally ill person, who is
111

This American Life, supra, note 2
Id.
113
Deposition of Charles Buckman, supra, note 93.
114
The decision to refuse medical treatment is a much more serious decision than to profit off of the use of one’s
personal information. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (holding that a competent person
may refuse life sustaining treatment); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10 (1976) (allowing the father of a woman in a
persistent vegetative state to remove life-sustaining treatment); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a dying patient has the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment).
112
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already vulnerable, to engage in behavior that they may not have without Caramadre’s
suggestion.
PART IV. CRIMINAL CHARGES & CIVIL LIABILITY—
Once the financial institutions figured out what Caramdre was doing, they attempted
recover some of their lost profits in civil court. 115 Unfortunately for them, Caramadre’s
“creation” worked exactly as he imagined. 116 First, variable annuities were treated differently
than insurance contracts under Rhode Island law, which meant that they were not subject to
statutory prohibitions against strangers taking them out on strangers. 117 Second, the variable
annuities each contained incontestability clauses, 118 which were enforced by the court and
prevented the financial institutions from rescinding the policies even on grounds of fraud. 119
The incontestability clauses, which were inserted by the financial institutions, served to negate
the financial institutions’ claims of fraud, conspiracy, and recission or voidability of the
policies. 120 For these reasons, most of the claims against Caramadre were dismissed. 121

115

W. Reserve Life Assur. Co. of Ohio v. Conreal LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 270, 276 (D.R.I. 2010) on reconsideration
in part sub nom. W. Reserve Life Assur. Co. of Ohio v. Caramadre, 847 F. Supp. 2d 329 (D.R.I. 2012).
116
Id.
117
Section 27-4-27 of Rhode Island’s General laws provides “No person shall procure or cause to be procured any
insurance contract upon the life or body of another individual unless the benefits under the contract are payable to
the individual insured or his or her personal representatives, or to a person having, at the time when the contract was
made, an insurable interest in the individual insured.” R.I. Gen. Laws §27-4-27(a)(West 2010). Just as Caramadre
planned, the court held that the “insurable interest” requirement does not apply to variable annuities because they are
not “insurance contract[s] upon the life of another” Conreal LLC, supra, note116, at 276.
118
Incontestability clauses prevent insurance companies from rescinding the insurance policies. Id. Generally,
incontestability clauses are for the benefit of the insured. Id. The variable annuity policies contained incontestability
clauses that prohibited the insurers from rescinding even if the policy was fraudulently taken out. Id. In the case
against Caramadre, the financial institutions asked the court to erase the incontestability clause from the agreements
and hold them void against public policy. They asked this of the court even though they were the ones who inserted
them into the contracts.
119
Conreal LLC, supra, note 115, at 279-80.
120
Id. at 280-81.
121
Id. at 290.
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However, this victory was short-lived. In February 2012, the case was reopened after the
plaintiffs submitted a motion for reconsideration. 122 This litigation is ongoing at the time of this
writing. 123
A criminal investigation started with Caramadre and his associate, Raymour
Radhakrishnan, at the center. The two were indicted for conspiracy and multiple counts of
fraud. 124 The indictment alleged that the pair made affirmative misrepresentations of their
scheme to the terminally-ill and elderly patients and family members in exchange for their
personal information. 125 With this personal information, the indictment alleged that Caramadre
and Radhakrishnan obtained over 200 variable annuities and bonds without their consent or
knowledge. It is further alleged that some of these annuities and bond forms contained forged
signatures. Although Caramadre has never stated how much money he made off the scheme, the
indictment alleged that it generated more than $25 million in “illicit profits.” 126 It
Whether these charges reflect the reality of Caramadre’s “creation,” or whether they were
motivated by prosecutors that were outraged by Caramadre’s cavalier conduct is impossible to
determine. However, according to Caramadre’s lawyer and former Rhode Island Supreme Court
Justice, Robert G. Flanders, the pretext behind these charges is that the government lawyers and
investigators were angered by the unethical mechanics of the scheme. 127 Undoubtedly,
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Western Reserve Life Assur. Co. of Ohio v. Caramadre, 847 F. Supp. 2d 329 (D.R.I. 2012).
The District Court Judge dismissed several counts against Caramadre, Radhakrishnan and other defendants but
allowed other claims to proceed. “The counts alleging civil conspiracy (all cases except 09–470), unjust enrichment
(all cases), civil liability for crimes and offenses grounded in forgery (in cases 09–470, 09–549, and 09–564) will
proceed.” Id.
124
The indictment includes 66 separate counts against Caramadre and Radhakrishnan. There are 26 counts of wire
fraud, 15 counts of mail fraud, 1 count of conspiracy, 25 counts of identity fraud, 4 counts of aggravated identity
fraud, 1 count of money laundering, and 1 count of witness tampering. Indictment, supra, note 9; Gibbs, supra, note
59.
125
Indictment, supra, note 9; Gibbs, supra, note 59.
126
Indictment, supra, note 9.
127
“That he was a guy who was just throwing a few shekels at some poor, sick people at the end of their lives, and
he was reaping the lion's share of it. And they didn't like the stink or the smell of it, and they didn't like what they
considered the inequity of it.” This American Life, supra, note 2.
123
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Caramdre’s lawyers were concerned about jurors having a similar visceral reaction to the
charges. 128
After a highly contested debate about how the trial would be litigated, 129 opening
statements were made on November 12, 2012. 130 Caramadre and Radhakrishnan pled guilty to
two of the 66 counts: identity theft and conspiracy. 131 Each man faces a maximum of ten years
in prison. 132
Setting aside the criminal charges against them for the time being and focusing purely on
“the creation” itself, what Caramadre and Radhakrishnan did in setting up the creation was not
128

Caramadre and Radhakrishnan’s criminal trial began on November 12, 2012. The trial is expected to last two to
three months, including video testimony from the deceased annuitants. 2 RI Men to go to Trial in $25M Investment
Fraud, ASSOCIATED PRESS, available at http://www.wsoctv.com/news/ap/crime/2-ri-men-to-go-to-trial-in-25minvestment-fraud/nS4Yh/ (Nov. 12, 2012). Caramadre filed two motions, both of which were denied, in an attempt
to mitigate any further prejudice. Both motions were filed simultaneously. Because Radhakrishnan is appearing pro
se, Caradre attempted to sever the trial in order to limit the effect of Radhakrishnan’s inexperience. Additionally,
Caramadre attempted to waive his right to a jury trial, which might also cure any prejudice incurred by
Radhakrishnan’s inexperience. United States. v. Caramadre, 2012 WL 4364529, at *1 (D.RI, Sept. 21, 2012); United
States v. Caramadre, CR 11-186 S, 2012 WL 4762189 (D.R.I. Oct. 5, 2012).
129
On September 21, 2012, District Judge William E. Smith denied Caramadre’s motion to sever his trial from his
co-defendant, Raymour Radhakrishnan. Caramadre’s argument for severance was that because Radhakrishnan is
representing himself pro se, Caramadre will be irremediably prejudiced United States. v. Caramadre, 2012 WL
4364529, at *1 (D.RI, Sept. 21, 2012). In the First Circuit, a codefendant’s pro se representation is not grounds for
severance by itself. A defendant must also show that “strong prejudice” will result from the representation. United
States v. DeMasi, 40 F.3d 1306, 1313 (1st Cir. 1994). Additionally, the case law demonstrates that there is a strong
preference for joint trials, especially in cases involving conspiracy. United States v. Celestin, 512 F.3d 14, 19 (1st
Cir. 2010); United States v. Pena-lora, 225 F.3d 16, 33 (1st Cir. 2000). Radhakrishnan was admonished by the trial
court for representing himself, the joint trial proceeded and Radhakrishnan defended himself. In a hearing that took
place on August 7, 2012, the Court warned Radhakrishnan that he would make mistakes at trial and that
Caramadre’s lawyers may not be there to help him out. United States v. Caramadre, 2012 WL 4364529, at *2
(D.RI, Sept. 21, 2012). The Court did appoint stand-by counsel for Radhakrishnan to consult with. Id. Caramdre also
attempted to waive his right to a jury trial and proceed with a bench trial. The government objected. His motion for
leave to waive a jury trial was denied United States v. Caramadre, CR 11-186 S, 2012 WL 4762189 (D.R.I. Oct. 5,
2012). A defendant may waive his right to a jury trial if (1) the defendant waives it in writing; (2) the government
consents; (3) the court approves. Id.; Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(a). Effectively, this gives the government, the court, or
both the right to veto the defendant’s request. United States v. Caramadre, supra, note 46. There is no
constitutional right to a bench trial. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34 (1965). Singer left open the possibility
that a court may allow a defendant to waive his right to a jury trial over the government’s objections. United States
v. Caramadre, supra, note 46. As Judge Smith noted, “[a]s Singer and its progeny suggest, overruling a
governmental objection to a bench trial is a last resort and should only be instituted when an impartial jury is either
impossible or extremely unlikely.” Id.
130
RI Men to go to Trial in $25M Investment Fraud, ASSOCIATED PRESS ( Nov. 12, 2012),
http://www.wsoctv.com/news/ap/crime/2-ri-men-to-go-to-trial-in-25m-investment-fraud/nS4Yh/.
131
See Jake Bernstein, Insurance Schemer Cops a Plea, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 19, 2012 6:01 P.M.),
http://www.propublica.org/article/insurance-schemer-cops-a-plea
132
Id.
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mala prohibita since the scheme itself did not violate any federal or civil laws. 133 What they did,
if they did anything wrong, was mala in se. 134 It was wrong, ethically, in and of itself. It was
ethically wrong because it values death over life.
PART V--ETHICS
Caramadre created a market for death. 135 Being that the United States been steeped in a
philosophy of natural law, it is easy to see why a market for death would be taboo. 136 Natural
law espouses the sacredness and value of all human life, regardless of the form it takes. 137 To
create a market for death is in immediate conflict to this idea. It values death over life, literally.
The natural law tradition is not the only school of ethics that would oppose a market for
death and dying. For instance, a utilitarian 138 might argue that the social utility of such a market
serves only a select few—i.e., Caramadre, his investors, and the annuitants—to the detriment of
the greater public in that these types of schemes created market instability and ultimately
contributed to the collapse of the stock market. 139 On the other hand, a utilitarian might argue
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Caramadre and Radhakrishnan were not charged with violating a criminal statute that prohibits taking out an
insurance policy on a third party. Rather, they were indicted on several charges of various types of fraud and
conspiracy. See Indictment, supra, note 9.
134
I use malum prohibidum and mala in se not to argue that this type of crime should be classified as such legally.
Rather, I borrow the terms to flesh out a clearer picture of why Creation 18 was so morally dubious. The terms
malum prohibidum and mala in se further obfuscate the distinction between law and ethics that Holmes sought to
draw. Holmes would likely argue that all laws are malum prohibidum because the law is ultimately ambivalent to
morality. An act cannot be legally wrong in and of itself because humans decide what the law is, and no act is
legally wrong until humans decide that it is. See generally Holmes, supra, note 18 (distinguishing law from
morality). Of course the argument can be made that these terms have no actual meaning within the law but rather
are ethical rationales for why we humans have written criminal laws, thus, making them ethical rather than legal
fictions.
135
See infra PART V for a discussion on the commoditization of death and dying.
136
The natural law philosophy appears to be waning in popularity. BARRY R. FURROW, ET AL. BIOETHICS: HEALTH
CARE LAW AND ETHICS 8-9 (6th ed. 2008).
137
Id. Hence, why many natural law theorists oppose abortion and physician assisted suicide.
138
Stated very generally, utilitarians believe that the correct moral choice is the one that does the greatest good for
the greatest number of people. Id. at 6.
139
See infra PART V. A. for a discussion on economic theories of morality in transactions as well as a discussion of
credit default swaps, which led to the collapse of the housing market and major financial institutions. It is not my
contention that Caramadre’s scheme brought down the stock market. Rather, it was exploitation of financial devices
by sophisticated investors coupled with greed, fervor over driving up profits, and a lack of oversight and regulation
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that this type of transaction was beneficial not only to Caramadre and his investors but also to the
terminally ill annuitants and would thus be justifiable. 140 This argument may be justifiable on a
case-by-case basis where the annuitant was fully informed and did not feel exploited. However,
because of the inherent problems of dealing with the terminally ill about complex financial
matters, it is unlikely that this argument would have much force across the entire spectrum of
annuitants. Annuitants such as Robert Mizzoni obviously would strongly disagree that he
benefitted from this transaction. 141 Additionally, the way in which Caramadre knowingly
exploited a mistake in an investment contract disrupts the stability of the market place and
undermines the public trust in financial institutions, upon which, for better or worse, our
economy depends.
Further, Kantian virtue ethics would likely condemn the practice of knowingly exploiting
another’s mistake for one’s own profit, as well as coercing physically and financially vulnerable
people to do the same. 142 Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative implored
human beings to “[a]ct in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in
the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an
end.” 143 What Caramadre did seems to directly contradict this formulation. He, individually and
through Radhakrishnan, treated both the financial institutions and the terminally ill as a means to
his own financial success.
that led to the collapse. Caramadre’s scheme and the complicity of the financial institutions speaks to the endemic
lack of accountability and responsibility on the part of certain highly sophisticated investors and investments.
140
This is precisely what Caramadre would argue. See Jake Bernstein, Insurance Schemer Cops a Plea,
PROPUBLICA (Nov. 19, 2012 6:01 P.M.), http://www.propublica.org/article/insurance-schemer-cops-a-plea (noting
that “In Caramadre’s view, he was offering money to the needy that they had not expected to receive.”).
141
See, supra, notes 99 & 100 for quotes by and background of Robert Mizzoni.
142
The crux of Kantian virtue ethics is Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative, which implores a person to act as
though the maxim of their action were to become universal law. Or, as Kant put it in his first formulation, “Act only
according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become universal law without
contradiction.” IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 30 (James W. Ellington trans.,
Hackett 3d. ed.1993)(1785).
143
Id.
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For these reasons, I believe that “Creation 18” was morally mala in se, wrong in and of
itself. Given that much of society draws from these ethical traditions in one way or another, it is
likely why the grand jury returned a 66 count indictment against the men. A person who is
cynical about the ability of the jury to put aside their personal opinion of the defendant might say
that this is the reason that the men pled guilty to two of the counts rather than stand trial on all of
them. They might have realized that that in order to acquit, they needed to raise
counterarguments that conflict with thousands of years of moral teachings. Even though what
these men did was technically legal, they would have had to persuade a jury to disregard these
moral principles in order to focus purely on abstract legal doctrines, something that is much more
easily done in theory than in practice.
It is important to flesh out the ethical complexities in greater detail. These ethical
conundrums ask fundamentally different questions than whether or not the conduct was legal. 144
Further, it is necessary to look to the actions of the financial institutions who created these
financial devices to see whether they are at all accountable for allowing Caramadre’s “creation”
to continue. Even if it is ethical, one important question is whether or not the financial
institutiuons have a duty to ask questions about the health status of the annuitants.
A. Caramadre is a Bad Man
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes would likely consider Caramadre a bad man. 145 Holmes,
one of the most respected Supreme Court Justices, 146 believed in a distinction between morality
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See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARVARD L. REV. 457 (1897).
Id.
146
Although highly revered, Holmes is not without his judicial blemishes. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)
(holding that states may sterilize mentally handicapped individuals against their wishes. “We have seen more than
once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call
upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those
concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those
145
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and law. 147 The law, according to Holmes, is a creation of man, flawed and imperfect. It did not
“flow from some mysterious omnipresence in the sky, and ... judges are not independent
mouthpieces of the infinite.” 148 Holmes used the “bad man” as an example of why law and
morality should be looked at as separate entities. 149 In order to study and fully understand the
law, Holmes urged that the law itself must be looked at as a bad man. The bad man cares only
about the material consequences of his actions. 150 Although he might engage in entirely
unscrupulous behavior if left to his own devices, the bad man still cares about the consequences
of his actions because he, like everyone else, does not want to be punished. 151 Although the bad
man’s neighbors might follow the law out of an overarching sense of morality or duty, this does
not change the fact that the law prohibits and punishes certain behavior regardless of the
underlying intention. 152
Holmes found the law of contract at the epicenter of the confusion between law and
morality. 153 If we look at the law as a bad man, the only difference between committing a tort
and committing breach of contract is that in the former the tortfeasor has to pay damages; in the
latter, one has to pay damages unless an agreed upon event takes place—for example,

who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad
enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes... Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”)
147
Holmes, supra, note 144.
148
FRANCIS BIDDLE, JUSTICE HOLMES, NATURAL LAW, AND THE SUPREME COURT 49 (1960). While recognizing a
distinction between law and morality, Holmes did not think the law entirely devoid of moral teachings. “The law is
the witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its history is the history of the moral development of the race.
The practice of it, in spite of popular jests, tends to make good citizens and good men.” Holmes, supra, note 40.
149
Holmes, supra, note 144.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Of course, the law does care about intent in many instances, but Holmes found these to be more legal fictions
than moral certitudes. “The law talks about rights, and duties, and malice, and intent, and negligence, and so forth,
and nothing is easier, or, I may say, more common in legal reasoning, than to take these words in their moral sense,
at some state of the argument, and so to drop into fallacy.” Id.
153
Id.
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performance of the contractual obligations. 154 Those who imbue the law with ethics would view
this idea as repugnant. 155 However, when stripped down to its fundamental consequences, this is
how the law of contracts operates. 156
The idea that a contract is a meeting of the minds of the parties was pure fallacy to
Holmes. 157
Suppose a contract is executed in due form and in writing to deliver a lecture,
mentioning no time. One of the parties thinks that the promise will be construed
to mean at once, within a week. The other thinks that it means when he is ready.
The court says that it means within a reasonable time. The parties are bound by
the contract as it is interpreted by the court, yet neither of them meant what the
court declares that they have said. In my opinion no one will understand the true
theory of contract or be able even to discuss some fundamental questions
intelligently until he has understood that all contracts are formal, that the making
of a contract depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention, but on
the agreement of two sets of external signs — not on the parties' having meant the
same thing but on their having said the same thing. 158
Holmes’ understanding of the law of contracts demonstrates the imperfect reality that the law
discards a party’s subjective intent in favor of objective proof. The intent of the parties is
irrelevant if not contained in the governing document.
This was the loophole that Caramadre intended to exploit. Caramadre knew the law of
insurance and annuities very well, and it was his job to exploit its weaknesses. By his own
account, he followed the law precisely. Caramadre had faith in the law. He believed that if he
abided by the letter of the law, he could exploit a loophole without retribution. Interestingly

154

Id. “The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep
it — and nothing else. If you commit a tort, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum. If you commit a contract, you
are liable to pay a compensatory sum unless the promised event comes to pass, and that is all the difference.”
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Lord Coke found that awarding specific performance of a breached contract would subvert the intent of the
covenantor to elect to choose between performing the contract or paying damages. Id. (citing Bromage v. Genning)
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Id.
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“We talk about a contract as a meeting of the minds of the parties, and thence it is inferred in various cases that
there is no contract because their minds have not met; that is, because they have intended different things or because
one party has not known of the assent of the other. Yet nothing is more certain than that parties may be bound by a
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Id.
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enough, he was right to a certain extent. His “creation” did not violate any criminal statute. 159
Caramadre’s “creation” is morally repugnant to most. 160 However, it seems to be within the
bounds of what the law accepts. 161 What the government contends in its indictment is that
Caramadre executed the scheme in a way that violated the law. 162
The way Caramadre used the variable annuities created a market for death. He was
looking for people with short life expectancies and was willing to pay them, essentially, to die.
The market for life was already in place. Caramadre merely found a way to exploit it as a private
citizen rather than a life insurance company. In doing so, he created a “legal” market for death.
For the same reasons that “Creation 18” was mala in se, 163 this market for death is likewise
morally reprehensible. In sum, it defies natural law by valuing death over life, runs counter to
utilitarian principles by placing the good of a few over the greater good, and exploits both the
terminally ill and the financial institutions in a way that flouts Kant’s Categorical Imperative.
Additionally, as noted above, Caramadre likely put himself in a position where he financially
coerced the annuitants into participating in this scheme. 164 Even though Caramadre is a “bad
man” and created a market for death, this would not have been possible without the complicity
and tacit consent of the financial institutions that sold and oversaw these transactions. 165
B.

Morals of the Marketplace
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Caramadre allegedly committed multiple counts of fraud and conspiracy. However, the creation as a thing in and
of itself is not violative of any criminal statute. Rather, the way in which Caramadre and Radhakrishnan conducted
business led to the multiple counts of fraud. See Indictment, supra, note 9.
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Life insurance companies make a living off of the life market. 166 These companies
provide insurance for a person’s loved ones in the event that he should die. 167 However, their
standards for issuing a policy are rather strict and each application for insurance is scrutinized
carefully by an actuary. For example, term life insurance covers an individual’s life for a fixed
term of years. If the person dies within that term, then their loved ones will be compensated. If
the person lives beyond the term of the insurance plan, then their coverage expires with no
financial benefit accrued to their loved ones. Every time a term life insurance plan is issued, the
company has determined that the insured is more likely than not to live beyond the term. In
order to be profitable, the company needs to make a very well educated bet on life. Caramadre
found a way to stack the deck and then make an even better educated bet on death. The
difference between Caramadre and the life insurance industry, even if it is a difference in name
only, is that life insurance makes wagers on the side of life paying whereas Caramadre always
wagered on death.
The commoditization of life has been in place for decades, if not centuries. 168 It serves a
beneficial social purpose by providing a safety net for individuals should they meet an untimely
demise. 169 The death market, i.e., a forum whereby there is an exchange of money for death,
however, has long operated outside of the law. 170 Now, it is wrong to condemn something
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And a handsome living at that! As of 2009, U.S. life insurance companies had capital and surplus in excess of
$300 billion. Table 1221 Life Insurance Companies—Summary 1990-2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1221.pdf (last viewed Dec. 11, 2012).
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Only in recent years has assisted suicide become legal in parts of the United States and Europe. See, e.g., The
Oregon Death With Dignity Act, Or. Rev. Stat. §§127.800-.897. This is obviously very different than Caramadre’s
case but it is a situation where one pays to die.

26

merely because history and tradition has done so as well, so it is important to look at the societal
benefits and detriments of commoditizing death in such a way.
Profiting off of the death of another merely for the sake of profit serves no justifiable
social purpose. 171 It is merely a reallocation of wealth from one party to another without
tangible exchange of ideas, work, or property. That is exactly what Caramadre designed this
“creation” to accomplish. He orchestrated a system in which, after an initial investment, he and
his investors profited from the death of the annuitant by financial institutions receiving payouts
from the financial institutions. He and his investors gave money to the companies and then after
a short period of time, they gave it back with interest and profits from the mutual fund
investment. There was no other exchange made beside a reallocation of wealth.
This type of investment, investments based on wholly intangible “commodities” without
a beneficial social purpose, became far too common on Wall Street for multiple reasons. 172 First,
there was a large, profitable market for these investments, which led to a fervor over such
investments, blinding the people and companies in charge of managing the investments to the
detrimental effect on the market. 173 Second, there was inadequate oversight and regulation over
these transactions. 174 The companies issuing the variable annuities did not perform the
perfunctory screening that usually occurred in life insurance because they stood to make a profit
on such plans. 175

171

Life insurance, as described above, does serve an important social function of providing for the family of a loved
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CONCLUSION
Joseph Caramadre’s creative exploitation of the fine print may landed in him trouble that
he is likely not prone to repeat. Even though it is very possible that the terminally-ill and dying
annuitants may have been capable of consenting to such a scheme, Caramadre toed a fine line
that could have been easily overstepped depending on the health and financial status of the
chosen annuitant. Regardless of what may have occurred during each of the underlying
transactions, there are several arguments to be made that what Caramadre did, in and of itself,
was wrong. Essentially, he created a market for death and dying, which goes against numerous
ethical principles. But the blame is not to be placed entirely on his shoulders. Without the help
and complicity of the financial institutions that sold these products, “Creation 18” would have
been nothing more than an interesting legal loophole tucked away in the corner of Joseph
Caramadre’s brain, having never reached fruition.
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